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Abstract 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) can impose important future cost on the 
government, which in turn create obligations similar to public debt obligations for 
financing infrastructure investment. Apart from that, government guarantees, typical 
in PPP contracts, constitute explicit contingent liabilities. The risk that arises from 
such guarantees must be transparently valued to assess a country’s fiscal profile. In 
this study, we aim to show that the notion of a PPP as a (set of) contingent claim(s) 
can also be used to value the PPP public risk. Valuing contingent claims in this 
manner is important, as it allows us to compare more carefully different set-ups of a 
PPP. We introduce and analyse the different scenarios that were at the Chilean 
government’s disposal for executing a transport infrastructure project. Our findings 
reveal that, for the first years of a PPP programme, the burden on the surplus or deficit 
will be less in the case of the PPP compared to typical public investment. Secondly, 
the net contingent PPP flows constitute the real effect on the deficit and 
correspondingly on the public debt and weaken the government’s fiscal stance. 
Finally, we attribute a specific price to the PPP public risk introducing CDS valuation 
with and without counterparty (government) default.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Public-private partnerships in public policymaking 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are set between traditional public 
procurement and full privatization schemes. The production of public goods by the 
private sector serves various objectives, such as financing fiscal deficits, easing 
government debt, attracting foreign and domestic investment, liberalizing and 
deregulating target sectors and improving corporate effectiveness (Megginson and 
Netter, 2001). PPPs nowadays exist in many advanced and developing countries as a 
tool to better manage public activities. They are widely implemented in various 
sectors, such as energy (electricity, gas), water and sewerage, telecommunications, 
education, health and most commonly, transportation infrastructure (airports, seaports, 
roads, bridges, rail etc.).  
A PPP initiative constitutes a different approach, compared to the case when 
the government itself invests in producing a good or a service, and finances this 
investment through government revenues (such as taxation) or via government 
borrowing. In a PPP, since the private operator is accountable for the start-up capital 
expenditure of the project, the present capital expenditure of the government remains 
unaffected. However, the government may be obliged to pay the operator a fee under 
the PPP contract, or be contractually committed to purchase a predetermined quantity 
for the specific project or service, thus currently committing to increase its 
expenditures in the future.  
Moreover, PPPs often incorporate explicit contingent liabilities such as: a) 
obligations to purchase the PPP service or product and b) government guarantees, 
which take the form of loan guarantees, minimum revenues from services, or ensuring 
a minimum demand levels. A government guarantee, which is a common feature in a 
PPP contract, obliges a government to take up an obligation, should a specific event 
occur and thus constitutes a significant source of public risk.  
1.2 Literature and contribution 
There is a growing literature that links PPPs and issues, such as fiscal risk, 
contingent commitments, accounting treatment, classification of the PPP asset and 
macroeconomic effects.1 Scholars generally discuss an overall assessment of PPPs, 
defining them, connecting them to risk transfer and pinpointing the absence of 
standardized reporting guidelines. The studies cover the aspect of fiscal risk in a 
framework of government guarantees and the relevant contingent liabilities, many of 
which arise from PPP agreements. They also refer to PPPs as a method to reverse the 
declining trend of public investment and stress the imperative need for an 
internationally accepted accounting treatment and disclosure of PPPs.  
Respectively, the key determinants in this process to follow up on are the 
contingent flows that arise from relevant commitments of the PPP project. In this 
paper, we focus on the notion of a PPP as a (set of) contingent claim(s), which can 
also be used to value the public exposures from the PPP. Valuing contingent claims in 
this manner is important, as it allows us to compare more carefully different set-ups of 
a PPP. Taking into account risk pricing, we want to investigate the conditions under 
which governments engage in alternative types of PPPs in order to minimize the net 
                                                 
1 IMF (2005a), IMF (2005b), IMF (2004a), (IMF 2004b), Hemming (2006), Eurostat (2004), Fourie 
and Burger (2001), Dewatripont and Legros (2005), Sadka (2006), Navarro (2005), Engel et al. (2008). 
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negative effects on national debt and to assess the impact of the relevant government 
guarantees. To do so, we use data from PPPs that were successfully implemented in 
Chile for developing transportation infrastructure. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the 
Chilean case and the concept of the net contingent flows. In section three, the various 
scenarios which are used to price the PPP risk are analysed. Finally, section four 
concludes. 
 
2 Net contingent flows and fiscal implications 
2.1 The Chilean case 
PPPs were introduced by the Chilean government in the early and mid-1990s 
in an attempt to attract private capital to support infrastructure investment. The 
administration realized a programme to finance highways of over 2,000 kilometres 
with a total investment of US$3.3 billion (Gomez-Lobo and Hinojosa, 2000).  
The Chilean PPPs were chosen because of several reasons. First of all, the size 
of the programme constituted the largest part of the overall public investment and a 
substantial portion of the country’s gross domestic product. These PPPs were 
therefore very influential, impacting significantly the national accounts. Furthermore, 
the Chilean PPP scheme was very successful in terms of on-time design and 
construction development, cost budget accuracy and flexibility when encountering ex 
post problems such as expropriations and the like. Reasons for this success were the 
programme’s straightforward regulatory framework, the concrete structure, the clear 
bidding process and the steady financing (which was also “protected” by government 
guarantee provisions). Finally, the validity and reliability of the data of the Chilean 
PPP projects was a decisive feature in choosing this case study.  
Almost 75 per cent of the programme funding for PPPs refers to the main 
north-south Pan American highway, also known as “Route 5.” More specifically, the 
data include the southern part of the route, which is divided in eight sections and is, in 
total, about 1,500 kilometres long.2 All the projects are in full operation, whereas the 
contracts foresee balanced toll level policy that set roughly equal toll payments in all 
segments of the expressway.3 As such, we are able to use an average toll rate for our 
valuation. Other common features include similar funding level per km and mutual 
design parameters. 
2.2 Guarantees, expected revenues and fiscal balances 
The legislature framework in Chile concerning the construction, maintenance 
and operation of public infrastructure via PPPs incorporated flexible tender 
procedures, establishment of mutual rights and obligations between the private and 
the public partner and the use of incentives for private participation (Lorenzen, 
Barrientos and Babbar, 2004). More specifically, the provision constituted of 
subsidies, government guarantees and revenue sharing schemes. The guarantees 
concerned a minimum revenue level that was guaranteed by the government, 
following the exploitation of road tolls by the private partner(s). On the other side, the 
                                                 
2 Table 1.A in the appendix summarizes all the data for the Route 5 projects. For simplicity, we do not 
consider operation and maintenance costs, since they constituted only a small portion of the overall 
investment for the project. 
3 Average toll per km varies between CH$ 12 and CH$ 13. 
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government would share project revenues with the private partner in cases when these 
revenues exceeded specific thresholds which were set within the PPP contracts.  
More specifically, the Chilean government initiated the bids with a total 
revenue guarantee equalling to 70 per cent of the estimated official cost of the project 
(including investments, operating costs and maintenance costs).4 Table 2.A in the 
appendix includes detailed data on the discounted amounts of the guarantees, the 
expected revenues and the net contingent flows for each project and each year.5 In the 
case that the expected revenue from the project is less than the guarantee that is 
foreseen in the adjudication contracts and their amendments, the remaining amount 
must be covered by the government. In almost all cases we studied, the guarantee is 
triggered since the guarantee level is greater than the expected revenue level. The 
table also shows the net contingent flows for each project, as the difference between 
expected revenues and guarantees, under the condition that the guarantee is greater 
than the excepted revenues. 
We include these net contingent flows to the actual deficit/surplus of Chile to 
observe the real effect on the national accounts (data on Chile is obtained from 
Velasco, 2008). Table 1 shows the initial deficit/surplus for each year, the net 
contingent flow that is generated from the PPP guarantees and the actual 
deficit/surplus including these contingent amounts since 2000. This last column thus 
displays the real effect of the PPP risk which emerges from the guarantees, on the 
Chilean government deficit/surplus. The net contingent flows start being visible in 
2000, when the first guarantees were implemented and either reduce each year’s 
surplus or increase the deficit.  
 
Table 1: Chilean government deficit / surplus deficit and total net contingent 
flows, million CH$, years 1990-2007 
Year Chilean government deficit/surplus 
Total net contingent 
flow for year 
Chilean government deficit/surplus 
including net contingent flow 
1990 234.554 0 234.554 
1991 202.020 0 202.020 
1992 343.956 0 343.956 
1993 273.940 0 273.940 
1994 348.149 0 348.149 
1995 879.878 0 879.878 
1996 685.175 0 685.175 
1997 709.336 0 709.336 
1998 150.940 0 150.940 
1999 -790.491 0 -790.491 
2000 -267.082 -877 -267.959 
2001 -232.747 -11.615 -244.362 
2002 -574.822 -17.834 -592.656 
2003 -230.470 -22.728 -253.198 
2004 1.244.460 -26.084 1.218.376 
2005 3.021.740 -30.844 2.990.896 
2006 5.984.100 -35.921 5.948.179 
2007 7.551.080 -40.533 7.510.547 
Cumulative 19.533.716 -186.435 19.347.281 
Sources:  1. Ministry of Finance, Coordinación General de Concesiones, Ministry of Public Works, Santiago, Chile 
                                                 
4 The 70 per cent (of the official cost) revenue guarantee was chosen due to its direct link with the debt 
financing of the project. The average debt of the consortium of private partners was 70 per cent of their 
assets. 
5 Detailed calculations for the expected revenues are available by the authors.  
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2. Authors’ calculations 
3 Valuing public-private partnership risk: a scenario analysis 
Following the calculation of the PPP net contingent flows this part includes 
the scenario analysis that contributes to the proper valuation of expected cash flows 
and contingencies that arise from PPP contracts. We will explain four different 
scenarios, this being the typical public investment, the public private partnership; the 
public private partnership with credit default swap (CDS) and no counterparty default 
risk, and the public private partnership with CDS and counterparty default risk. 
3.1 Scenario A: Typical public investment / self-finance 
Scenario A assumes that the PPP project is de facto realized by the 
government without the participation of the private partner. In figure 1, we develop a 
flow chart with all the cash inflows and outflows that follow a public investment 
project, the three basic actors (the lenders, the government and the end-users) and the 
major procedures (the operation / exploitation, the construction and the facility 
management). We can observe the positive and negative effects to the public debt and 
the fiscal accounts (capital and current account) of self-financing an infrastructure 
project. 
 
Figure 1: Positive and negative effects in public accounts for Scenario A: Typical 
Public Investment / Self-Finance 
 
 
                                                         
There is a direct effect on the primary balance and the present capital account 
of the government, since the initial investment cost of the project and its prospective 
revenue will be included in the deficit or surplus for the years in question. This 
changes the deficit/surplus of the years following the initiation of the project.  
Table 2 presents these figures before and after the investment costs and the 
project revenues. In principle, the last column of the table shows the effect on the 
Chilean government deficit/surplus considering that it financed the Route 5 projects. 
This is the initial deficit/surplus, minus the estimated investment cost, plus the 
expected discounted revenue for each year. For the years 1995 through 1997 the effect 
on government surplus is negative; the government surplus decreases due to the total 
investment cost of seven out of the eight sections of Route 5 that were initiated during 
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that period.6 At the same time, there is no expected revenue for these years yet, to 
counterbalance the negative cost effect. The investment gradually starts to offset after 
year 1998, when the road is used. For the upcoming years, there is either a decrease in 
the deficit or an increase in the surplus due to the expected revenues.  
 
 
Table 2: Chilean government deficit/surplus, investment cost, project revenues, 
million CH$, years 1990-2007 
Year Chilean government deficit/surplus 
Estimated 
investment cost 
Expected project 
revenue, discounted  
Deficit/surplus including 
the project revenue and 
cost  
1990 234.554 0 0 234.554 
1991 202.020 0 0 202.020 
1992 343.956 0 0 343.956 
1993 273.940 0 0 273.940 
1994 348.149 0 0 348.149 
1995 879.878 - 72.609 0 807.269 
1996 685.175 - 221.386 0 463.789 
1997 709.336 - 368.149 0 341.187 
1998 150.940 - 345.218 7.101 -187.177 
1999 -790.491 0 15.011 -775.480 
2000 -267.082 0 16.541 -250.541 
2001 -232.747 0 24.912 -207.835 
2002 -574.822 0 45.971 -528.851 
2003 -230.470 0 43.820 -186.650 
2004 1.244.460 0 41.769 1.286.229 
2005 3.021.740 0 39.814 3.061.554 
2006 5.984.100 0 37.950 6.022.050 
2007 7.551.080 0 36.174 7.587.254 
Cumulative 19.533.716 - 1.007.362 309.063 18.835.417 
Sources:  1. Ministry of Finance, Coordinación General de Concesiones, Ministry of Public Works, Santiago, Chile 
2. Author’s calculations 
 
Consequently, from a debt sustainability point of view, the investment was 
realized in a time of Chilean prosperity, allowing the government to conclude a large 
investment without harming the fiscal position in the long run (and probably leading 
to benefits in the long run). The fact that the Chilean fiscal conditions are improving 
throughout the period enhances the affordability of such projects within the 
government budget constraint, not affecting (indirectly) public debt in the short run.7  
3.2 Scenario B: public-private partnership 
The initial investment for every section of the Route 5 projects is financed by 
the private consortium and constitutes no burden for the government. More 
specifically, the Chilean government is not obliged to pay any kind of fee to the road 
operator, and is not obliged to purchase a predetermined quantity after the road is 
delivered. As a result, neither the present nor the future public expenditure will bear 
the burden of either the new project or future PPP payments. The primary deficit will 
remain unaffected in this context. However, the private partner charges toll fees to 
                                                 
6 We assume that the year of the award of each project, is the year that the government would fund the 
investment, if it were to finance the project itself. 
7 The self-finance approach seems to be beneficial in an economy with good fiscal performance. A 
similar analysis for economies that face difficulties to maintain a sustainable fiscal path would be a 
good counterfactual scenario and an issue for further research. 
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end-users. These user fees are a source of revenue that would be collected by the 
government in the self-finance scenario, raising the government revenue once the road 
is operational.  
Figure 2 shows the positive and negative effects on public debt and the fiscal 
balances, considering the PPP scenario. The new actor that is added in the flowchart 
compared to figure 1, is the private partner who now borrows money from an external 
funder to design, build and finance the project. The private partner undertakes the 
loans and is responsible for amortization and interest payments to the external lending 
institute. Alongside, he receives the project’s revenue via tolls exploitation and also 
bears the construction and facility management costs. Moreover, we introduce two 
new contingent flows for the government, the guarantees with a negative effect on the 
future current account and the revenue sharing flows with a positive effect on the 
future current account.  
 
Figure 2: Positive and negative effects in public accounts for Scenario B: Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) 
 
3.3 Scenario C: public-private partnership with CDS / no counterparty 
default risk 
The valuation of the contingencies in the form of PPP guarantees is achieved 
using derivatives valuation techniques and more specifically the CDS valuation.8 This 
scenario assesses the price of the guarantee without considering counterparty risk. 
This guarantee is directly linked to the credit risk of the project and the CDS can serve 
as a tool to reduce the credit risk exposure of the government. The credit event in this 
case is the triggering of the minimum revenue guarantee. If the toll revenue falls 
behind the specific threshold that is foreseen in the PPP contract, then the government 
will have to activate the guarantee. However, it can buy protection against this 
possibility, by insuring via a CDS the contingent amount that it will reimburse the 
private partner.  
The present scenario with the CDS and the effects of the PPP on the debt and 
on the fiscal balances is shown in figure 3. Compared to the previous scenario of the 
plain PPP arrangement, most of the cash flows and the basic actors are the same. The 
four actors are the government, the private partner, the lenders and the end-users, 
while the flows of payments concerning loans, construction and maintenance costs, 
                                                 
8 For the valuation of the risk that arises from PPP contingencies, we calculate the payoff from a typical 
CDS using the methodology and assumptions described in Hull (2006).  
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revenues and the contingent flows (guarantees and the revenue sharing scheme) have 
the same direction. We introduce a new basic actor who issues the CDS. This is a 
financial intermediary, for example an insurance company. There are two flows 
between this intermediary and the government: a cash outflow from the government - 
which is the purchaser of the swap - in the form of periodic payments towards the 
intermediary until the private partner defaults (or until the expiration of the CDS) and 
a contingent cash inflow towards the government, which is the payoff in the case of 
the private partner default. This flow of actual and contingent amounts is also 
applicable in the fourth scenario of a PPP with CDS and counterparty default risk. 
 
 
Figure 3: Positive and negative effects in public accounts for Scenarios C and D: 
Public-Private Partnership with credit default swap 
 
 
To value the PPP risk via the CDS we first need to address the projects’ 
default probabilities. According to each project’s credit ratings we calculate the 
unconditional default probabilities using an average default rate.9 We then proceed 
with computing the CDS as the present value of the expected payoff of the PPP 
investment minus the present value of the CDS payments made by the government, 
plus any accrual payments.10 Table 3 consolidates all calculations of the expected 
CDS payments, payoffs and accruals.  
    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 The rates and respective default probabilities were retrieved from Standard and Poor’s 
“Understanding Standard and Poor’s Ratings Definitions.” The authors have calculated the relevant 
survival probabilities.  
10 We assume a discount rate (LIBOR average) of 4,91 per cent, a recovery rate (R) of 40 per cent 
(typically used for the calculation of a CDS), halfway-year defaults and yearly CDS payments. The 
present value of the payoff is the discounted value of the probability of default multiplied by (1 – R) for 
each year of the contract. The expected payments of the PPP are the sum of the discounted values of 
the probability of survival multiplied by the rate at which payments are made per year. The authors 
have available the detailed calculations per year and per project for all the aforementioned figures. 
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Table 3: Expected CDS payments, accruals and payoffs 
Project Expected Payment Expected Accrual Expected Payoff 
Talca – Chillan 6,9467*s 0,0100*s 0,0120 
Santiago - Los Vilos 6,0372*s 0,0480*s 0,0576 
La Serena - Los Vilos 5,4581*s 0,0191*s 0,0230 
Chillan – Collipulli 4,7432*s 0,0377*s 0,0453 
Temuco - Rio Bueno 5,0220*s 0,0008*s 0,0009 
Rio Bueno - Puerto Montt 4,8992*s 0,0172*s 0,0206 
Collipulli – Temuco 4,1629*s 0,0060*s 0,0072 
Santiago – Talca 4,3673*s 0,0063*s 0,0075 
Total 41,6366*s 0,1451*s 0,1742 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The expected payoff is the expected amount that shall be paid in case the private partner defaults 
 
The total expected payments for CDS, adding up all the reference years and 
projects, are 41,6366s and the total accrual payments are 0,1451s, with s being the 
CDS spread. The sum (41,7817s) constitutes the total of CDS payments for the 
periods in question, while the total expected payoffs in case the private partner 
defaults are 0,1742. Equating these figures, gives us the value of s: 41,7817s = 0,1742 
and s = 0,00417. This implies that the mid-market CDS spread should be 0,00417 
times the notional principal or 41,7 basis points per year. In absolute terms, if we 
consider that the notional principal is the maximum amount of the guarantees that are 
covered via the CDS, then the mid-market CDS spread is the total discounted values 
of the guarantees times the spread, so 459.023*0,00417= 1.914 million CH$.11 This is 
the price of the risk exposure for the government using the CDS spread as a measure 
for the guarantee valuation. 
3.4 Scenario D: public-private partnership with CDS / counterparty default 
risk 
The last scenario still uses the above valuation to price PPP guarantees and the 
assumption that the government insures the project via a CDS, but also considers the 
default risk of the government.12 This assumption is especially relevant in developing 
countries with unstable economies. The process and the requisites for the calculations 
are similar to the case of no counterparty default risk in scenario C.  
 We use credit ratings for both the reference entity and the counterparty. If the 
credit index for the reference entity falls below its default barrier before the credit 
index for the counterparty does so, payments continue up to the time of default with a 
final accrual payment. If the counterparty defaults first and the credit index for the 
counterparty falls below its default barrier before the credit index for the reference 
entity does so, payments continue up to the time of the default, with no final accrual 
payment. In the first case there is a payoff while in the second case there is no payoff. 
If neither the counterparty nor the reference entity default, then payments continue for 
the whole lifetime of the CDS and there is no payoff.  
In order to estimate the CDS spread in this case, we have to recalculate the 
CDS expected payments incorporating this time the default probability of the 
counterparty, this being the Chilean government. Since the accruals and the payoffs 
do not apply in the case that the counterparty defaults first, their figures are the same 
                                                 
11 The discounted values of the minimum income guarantees amount to 459.023 million CH$. This is 
the sum of the guarantee totals for all projects as they appear in Table 2.A of the appendix. 
12 For example, the government may not meet its contractual obligations in the form of payments, fees 
or guarantees towards the private partner. 
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as calculated in Scenario C previously. However, we have to re-compute each 
expected CDS payment, taking into consideration the default probabilities of Chile. 
Using the default and survival probabilities of the Chilean government, we obtain a 
new present value of the CDS payments containing the risk of default from the 
counterparty. 
 
Table 4: Expected CDS payments including counterparty default 
Project Expected Payment, Discounted 
Talca – Chillan 6,9291s 
Santiago - Los Vilos 6,0204s 
La Serena - Los Vilos 5,4412s 
Chillan – Collipulli 4,7273s 
Temuco - Rio Bueno 5,0049s 
Rio Bueno - Puerto Montt 4,8826s 
Collipulli – Temuco 4,1476s 
Santiago – Talca 4,3512s 
Total 41,5043s 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
  Table 4 shows the expected payments of a CDS including the counterparty 
(Chilean government) default risk.13 The total expected payments for this scenario is 
41,5043s and, given that the total accrual payments are 0,1451s, the total payments 
for the CDS with counterparty default risk is 41,6494s. Then, since the total expected 
payoffs are 0,1742, the CDS spread is  0,00418.14 In absolute terms, the mid-market 
spread for a CDS with counterparty default risk is 459.023*0,00418=1.919 million 
CH$. This is the actual price of the government risk, incorporating the counterparty’s 
probability of default as well. The result is, as expected, higher compared to scenario 
C because it also incorporates and additional type of risk. However, the difference is 
minimal since Chile has very high survival probability rates.   
The Chilean experience, due to the successful PPP programme in terms of 
design, development and transparency, provided us with an effective unit of analysis 
for the application of the scenario based model. In the figure below, we summarize 
our findings for each of the aforementioned scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 The default and survival probabilities, as well as the detailed calculations for the expected payments 
incorporating the counterparty default risk are available by the authors.  
14 This means that the mid-market CDS spread should be 0,00418 times the notional principal or 41,8 
basis points per year. 
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Figure 4: Scenario-based model for PPP risk valuation 
 
4 Conclusion 
4.1 Using private methods to assess public project risk in PPPs 
The main purpose of this paper is to propose a method that can be adapted to 
any country’s PPP programme and evaluate the effect that the PPP risk imposes on 
the national accounts. The contribution of the paper has two aspects. We introduce a 
novel finance technique to value the PPP risk and we present the various inflows and 
outflows that are realized with each different scenario. 
More precisely, the four scenarios are described as follows. The first scenario 
presents the case where all PPP projects are financed by the government as typical 
public investment. There is a direct effect on the present capital account of the 
government from the initial investment which is gradually counterbalanced by 
positive flows from user fees. In the PPP scenario, we introduce the fiscal effect of the 
net contingent flows for the government, as the difference between expected revenues 
and guarantees, should the latter be called. In the third and in the fourth scenario, we 
assume that the government can reduce its risk exposure from the guarantee, by 
buying protection against the probability of default via a CDS. We calculate the mid-
market CDS spread with (fourth scenario) and without (third scenario) considering the 
government’s probability of default. In this way, we evaluate the price of the public 
risk exposure in a PPP.  
4.2 Public commitments and policy lessons 
Policymakers must consider that the potential public-side obligations of PPPs, 
which are difficult to evaluate and often overlooked, are a feature of PPPs that may 
attribute to incomplete contracting. These commitments constitute by definition future 
liabilities for the government, should a specific event occur. Governments typically 
do not concentrate on the risk that comes from default of either the private partner or 
themselves, when assessing their overall risk profile. However, pricing of this risk is 
very important in terms of the proper valuation of the public debt because it 
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influences on debt dynamics. If governments do not consider the risk that originates 
from contingent commitments, then (new) government debt may not be appropriately 
assessed. The proposed valuation method gives policymakers the opportunity to 
capture all negative contingent cash flows that government commitments may cause.  
Currently, the financial crisis in Europe already shows that in any developing 
or developed country, it is likely that financial situations were not utterly and 
correctly assessed. There is a momentum now that stresses that policymakers and 
practitioners should monitor national governments better in their financial 
performance. In the EU, this translated to percentage thresholds for public debts and 
deficits and the European Commission committed itself to monitoring, as well as 
penalizing default of the set thresholds. When calculating these debt rates, PPP 
commitments in case of defaults should be taken into account, as otherwise countries 
might be able to hide public future liabilities. If anything, the current cases in Europe 
show that default by countries as well as private partners is likely to occur, if public 
fiscal balances deteriorate nationally or globally.  
The viewpoint of PPP contingencies (and the relevant risk) together with the 
cash flow analysis address an interesting policy lesson. PPPs are very close to a 
typical public investment from a government’s perspective. This is because, a) 
explicit contingent obligations that arise from PPPs can be considered similar to 
sovereign debt commitments that result from public borrowing, and b) project costs in 
terms of construction and operation or other cash outflows will - at some point in the 
future – burden the taxpayers. As is clear from our discussion, the proper valuation of 
the risks involved will ensure that government guarantees strike a balance between 
making the PPP financially viable, without creating the wrong incentives for the 
private and/or the public party.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1.A: Route 5 Projects Data 
Project, Route 5 Year project awarded 
Year of 
operation 
Investment in 
million CH$ 
Length in 
km 
Estimated 
average daily 
traffic 
Duration in 
years 
Talca – Chillan 1995 1998 72.609 192 9.000 10 
Santiago - Los Vilos  1996 1999 112.136 218 9.200 23 
La Serena - Los Vilos   1996 2000 109.250 228 2.500 25 
Chillan – Collipulli 1997 2001 93.924 160 5.900 22 
Temuco - Rio Bueno 1997 2001 85.119 172 3.500 25 
Rio Bueno - Puerto Montt 1997 2001 88.054 136 5.800 25 
Collipulli – Temuco 1997 2002 101.052 163 5.700 25 
Santiago – Talca 1998 2002 345.218 266 18.000 25 
TOTAL - - 1.007.362 1.535 59.600 - 
Source: Coordinación General de Concesiones, Ministry of Public Works, Santiago, Chile 
 
 
 
Table 2.A: Detailed data on guarantees, expected revenues and net contingent 
flows for Route 5 projects, discounted values in million CH$, years 1998-2007 
Year Talca - Chillan Santiago - Los Vilos La Serena - Los Vilos Chillan - Collipulli 
Revenues Guarantees Net flow Revenues Guarantees Net flow Revenues Guarantees Net flow Revenues Guarantees Net flow 
1998 7.101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 6.769 0 0 8.242 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 6.452 0 0 7.857 0 0 2.233 3.110 -877 0 0 0 
2001 6.150 10.802 -4.652 7.489 9.477 -1.988 2.129 4.303 -2.174 3.698 4.924 -1.226 
2002 5.862 11.443 -5.581 7.138 10.004 -2.866 2.029 4.411 -2.382 3.524 5.053 -1.529 
2003 5.588 12.205 -6.617 6.804 10.620 -3.816 1.934 4.553 -2.619 3.360 5.220 -1.860 
2004 5.326 12.726 -7.400 6.486 11.018 -4.532 1.843 4.596 -2.753 3.202 5.260 -2.058 
2005 5.077 13.544 -8.467 6.182 11.672 -5.490 1.757 4.736 -2.979 3.052 5.423 -2.371 
2006 4.839 14.292 -9.453 5.893 12.450 -6.557 1.675 4.915 -3.240 2.910 5.628 -2.718 
2007 4.613 14.655 -10.042 5.617 13.261 -7.644 1.597 5.090 -3.493 2.773 5.817 -3.044 
Total 57.777 89.666 -52.211 61.708 78.500 -32.891 15.197 35.714 -20.517 22.519 37.324 -14.805 
 
Year 
Temuco - Rio Bueno Rio Bueno - Puerto Montt Collipulli - Temuco Santiago - Talca Total 
contingent 
net flow 
for year 
Revenues Guarantees Net flow Revenues Guarantees Net flow Revenues Guarantees Net flow Revenues Guarantees Net flow 
1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -877 
2001 2.358 3.934 -1.576 3.090 3.036 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -11.615 
2002 2.247 4.034 -1.787 2.945 3.119 -174 3.469 6.483 -3.014 18.755 19.256 -501 -17.834 
2003 2.142 4.156 -2.014 2.807 3.218 -411 3.307 6.690 -3.383 17.877 19.885 -2.008 -22.728 
2004 2.042 4.201 -2.159 2.676 3.251 -575 3.152 6.746 -3.594 17.041 20.055 -3.014 -26.084 
2005 1.946 4.324 -2.378 2.551 3.344 -793 3.005 6.951 -3.946 16.243 20.663 -4.420 -30.844 
2006 1.855 4.483 -2.628 2.431 3.469 -1.038 2.864 7.209 -4.345 15.483 21.426 -5.943 -35.921 
2007 1.768 4.642 -2.874 2.318 3.595 -1.277 2.730 7.458 -4.728 14.758 22.190 -7.432 -40.533 
Total 14.358 29.774 -15.416 18.818 23.033 -4.269 18.527 41.537 -23.010 100.157 123.474 -23.317 -186.435 
Sources:  1. Coordinación General de Concesiones, Ministry of Public Works, Santiago, Chile 
2. Authors’ calculations 
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